That being said, the best ZDR agreement is the one that your company has directly with the inference provider(s). Unfortunately:
- Not everyone is large enough (or has enough $$) for that. - Ultimately you’re in the same position of having to “trust” that they’re doing ZDR; even after auditing their security docs.
Coincidentally later on I set my OR settings to only allow some providers that I can rely on, not blindly let OR route to wherever they like.
More importantly, many providers (AtlasCloud, Novita and StreamLake were named but there seems to be more implied in the blog post) have been rerouting requests to MiniMax servers on the backend and not processing their own prompts.
The obvious question is whether OpenRouter has done any auditing on their inference providers. Based on the researcher's blog post, I guess not.
https://www.dragos.com/blog/ai-supply-chain-security-canary-...
You do dont find real world company documents on the web that you could train on. And companies certainly won’t upload them to you so you can improve your models, not even with incentives. But provide a model with dirt cheap input pricing and free outputs - and you gut yourself a firehose.
To think that the “labs” wouldn’t train on this is like thinking they’d never have trained on shadow library books because, “well, it’s illegal”. They did it back then and it gave them an advantage over the competition. So why wouldn’t they now?
https://www.together.ai/blog/security-event-prompt-leakage-f...
though this is not similar as ZDR, it's crazy to see so many incidents in last few months.
I don't understand why these names are being coyly tiptoed around as if they're trying to protect the privacy of these companies blatantly lying about ZDR. Why isn't OR calling out the actual providers they off-boarded by name? Why is OR basically protecting them under a cover of anonymity?
Lost a lot of trust in OR that's for sure, in-spite of some other positive reception I see here for this move.
Edit: Wording update.
There's also a good article at https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/11/a-leaky-ai-supply-c... , and a few earlier comments at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50582794 , https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50585962 and https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50562582 .
It's clear from the breadth and variety of exposures that there's no due diligence or guardrails inside OpenRouter on who they market and how they classify their providers. Their response to this indicates a few first steps but none seem to have the force of law and i'd have expected more from a Stripe aquisition.
Very glad that my daily driver is a local model and I only use these external services sparingly.